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ABSTRACT
This work tests whether the introduction of divorce law changes the timing of marital search. Rational
agents should adjust to the divorce risk by increasing the average search spell, whereas option value
theory stresses the role of irreversible investments: in this case, the new exit option should result in
shorter spells. Using a dynamic model of marital search, a new data set of retrospective individual
Italian data, and two robust statistical specifications, we find strong evidence that the legal innovation
actually lowered the age at marriage, thereby worsening the level of marital matching, and possibly
reinforcing self-fulfilling prophecies of divorce.
If I am not for myself, who will be for me?
And if I am only for myself, what am I?
And if not now, when?
Pirqe Avot, 1:14.
1. INTRODUCTION
From the economic point of view, marriage is a long-run contract that
commands monogamy and couple-specific investments that are expected to
increase the value of the union across time. When legal norms forbid divorce,
the accumulation of marital human capital does not need to account for
default risk. In contrast, when unilateral divorce is permitted, married indi-
viduals run the risk of the partner walking away. Should this occur, most
couple-specific investments cannot be used without large switching costs over
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the next marriage. A common way to cover from such costs is to search
harder and longer for matches that are less likely to dissolve. Thus, if legal
norms make marriage a risky contract, rational agents should be very careful
about the quality of their matching. Nevertheless, no-fault divorce also pro-
vides the opportunity to break unilaterally an unhappy marriage: this action
prevents the risk of spending one’s life in distress and gloominess. By allow-
ing for this exit option, the same rational agents may become less cautious
when considering a marriageable mate and then could decide to stop their
search at an earlier age. Whether age at marriage decreases or increases in
response to the introduction of divorce is a matter of empirical investigation.
It is a controversial issue whether divorce laws change incentives to marry.
Until now, economic debate on the effects of divorce law has focused mainly
on changes from consensual to no-fault divorce legislation using aggregate
state-level data for the USA. The stream of literature that relates to Becker’s
application of Coase’s theorem to family organization (Peters, 1986, 1992;
Gray, 1998) maintains that marital bargaining can offset legal innovations,
while opponents (Allen, 1992; Friedberg, 1998) find that changes in legisla-
tion have a significant impact on divorce rates. Most recent approaches
(Wolfers, 2006) find that the impact on divorce rates is only temporary, while
in the long run the Coase theorem holds for married couples. The alternative
approach based on collective models (Chiappori et al., 2002) has long
stressed the role played by divorce laws in shifting bargaining positions
within marriage; nonetheless, this literature usually overlooks changing
marital roles over the life course that modify the incentives to divorce (Ott,
1992). Recently, Allen et al. (2006) have estimated the effect on the age at
marriage of a change from consensual to no-fault divorce legislation, con-
trolling for state heterogeneity and time trends: results show a slight increase
in the mean age at marriage and a 5 per cent increase in its standard deviation
for subjects living in states that adopted no-fault divorce. Basically, all pre-
vious literature is aimed at identifying the effects of changes in existing
divorce legislation, not the effect of ex novo divorce legislation.
This paper studies the effect on the age at marriage of the introduction of
divorce law in a social scenario in which marriage is not rescindable using
a microeconomic model of optimal sequential search (Matsushita, 1989;
Bougheas and Georgellis, 1999). The model is then estimated over a data set
of retrospective individual histories, using observations before and after the
reform. In our view, the process of mutual search is lengthy, costly, and
deeply interrelated with other crucial decisions in one’s life, such as the
educational path or participation in the labor market. These dimensions are
relevant since improving and refining personal traits—such as educational
attainment, physical appearance, financial robustness—may increase the
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probability of finding and matching with better partners. Yet these actions
are usually time-intensive and can be combined with marriage only at a
substantial cost. This shows the emergence of a trade-off between the prob-
ability of marriage and its timing, arising from strategic actions that boost
one’s competitive position in the marriage market, which in turn contribute
to postpone the event of marriage itself. In this context of dynamic action, the
notions of investment irreversibility and value of waiting (Dixit and Pindyck,
1994) play a key role. We test whether after the legal reform introducing
divorce, marriage has become a less irreversible investment. If so, the option
value of waiting for a better match should register a drop, resulting in shorter
search spells for the representative agent, provided that experiencing variety
of mates is not regarded as a source of utility in itself. Moreover, the intro-
duction of divorce has possibly affected the probability of marriage indirectly
as well, through changes in choice variables such as education and job status,
provided that participants in the marriage market attach value to specific
personal traits.
In the econometric section, two specifications, one parametric and
another semi-parametric, were estimated for the age at marriage on a panel
of 5814 Italian subjects. The legal regime change is modeled through a
Before–After estimator (Heckman et al., 1999; Lee, 2005): taking account
of time trends and personal characteristics including education, job status,
religious attendance and family background, we find that divorce has
strongly contributed to shorten the average search spell, mainly for women,
possibly reinforcing self-fulfilling prophecies of divorce. Most likely, this
differential result for gender specification depends on the binding biological
constraint that women have on fertility. Educational choices seem little
influenced by divorce, both for women and for men; on the contrary, the
same law increased the role played by men’s occupational status in deter-
mining age at marriage. Also, an educational level higher than similar indi-
viduals adversely affects the probability of marriage, but this peer effect is
stronger for men. After divorce was passed, religiously committed people
modified their search behavior: women shortened their search spells, while
no significant effect is reported for men. Above all, the strongest effect of
divorce reform appears to be a large decline in the value of marital search,
a result that confirms the irreversibility hypothesis and the underlying theo-
retical model.
With regard to background literature (Allen et al., 2006), this work has
three main innovative features. First, it takes advantage of a multivariate
panel structure that allows for observation of relevant age-related predictors.
Second, the effect of the very event of divorce introduction is tested and
found significant at explaining age at marriage: this very rarely appears in
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surveys on the same issue, since divorce was introduced in the USA long
before panel studies were started. Third, it is found that subjects under study
behaved according to the standard predictions of option value theory.
This paper proceeds as follows: the second section surveys basic facts
about marriage in Italy and presents evidence of aggregate trends; the third
section builds the dynamic model of marriage and divorce under the assump-
tion of no-fault divorce; the fourth describes the details of variables included
in the empirical model; the fifth discusses results from estimation; the sixth
provides final comments and further developments.
2. SOME STYLIZED FACTS
A preliminary outlook at the data1 from an aggregate point of view displays
some major trends occurring in the Italian marriage market between 1950
and 2001. During the period under scrutiny two main legal innovations in
marriage law took place. On 1 December 1970, following an ongoing Euro-
pean trend, the Italian Parliament passed a law permitting unilateral divorce:
while marital separation was already legally allowed, under the new regime,
for the first time in Italian history, spouses were allowed to untie the marriage
contract and possibly remarry after five years of legal separation. Four years
later, a public consultation promoted by traditional Catholics and Conser-
vatives for the abolition of the new law saw the anti-divorce coalition soundly
defeated. This event testified to the changing view of marriage spreading
through Italian society and an increasingly strong preference for more liberal
customs. Finally, the five-year waiting time between separation and divorce
was shortened to three years by a minor reform in 1987.
Over the years under study (1950–2001), the nuptiality rate (the total
number of marriages, in a given year, divided by the total population between
16 and 49 years old), plotted in figure 1, decreased from 1.4 per cent to 1 per
cent.2 In the same period, mean age at marriage increased for men from 28.9
to 31.26, whereas for women it recorded a striking increase from 24.97 to
28.49, as can be seen in figure 2. Both graphs show two different temporal
patterns for the two time series. Nuptiality rate shows a fairly steady down-
ward trend starting shortly after 1960, with temporary reversal around 1971
and 1987: since the total number of marriages also includes second and
1 Evidence provided in this section and in the graphs section is taken from ISTAT (Italian
Statistical Institute) and represent the whole statistical universe.
2 The USA experienced a decrease from 1.11 per cent to 0.84 per cent, the French crude marriage
rate fell from 0.79 per cent to 0.49 per cent, the German rate from 1.00 per cent to 0.47 per cent.
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subsequent marriages, the increased ratio accounts for those who were
waiting to divorce and remarry. The graph of mean age at marriage does not
show a similar neat trend; rather, it suggests a u-shaped curve with its lower
bound around the period 1970–80 and a steady increase until recent years.
Whether or not the 1970 divorce reform played a role in determining age at
marriage, its outcome was an increased variability of age at marriage,
whereas the minor reform of 1987 does not seem to affect the upward trend
of the same variable.
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Figure 1. Italian nuptiality rate (1950–2001).
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Figure 2. Mean age at marriage (1950–2001).
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The numbers for divorce and separation display the most striking evidence
for changing behavior of Italian couples, as shown in figure 3. In 1950, the
separation rate (the ratio between legal separations and new marriages in a
given year) was 1.5 per cent, while in 2001 the same ratio rocketed to 29.1 per
cent. During the period 1971–2001, the divorce rate (the ratio between total
divorces and new marriages in a given year) jumped from 4.2 per cent to 16.7
per cent.3
As a rule of thumb, the ratio between separations and marriages can be
considered an initial indicator of marital risk at an aggregate level. All
caveats provided, it can be affirmed that, without other a priori information,
marriage is steadily becoming a riskier business. On the one hand, the
observer could be tempted to establish a simple relationship between the
increasing level of marital risk and the increasing age at marriage: since
marriage is a long-run contract that calls for specific investments, an increase
in the average level of risk could be at least partially offset by an increase in
the quality of marriage, and then in the time spent in the search for a partner.
However, this does not seem the case for Italy, given the rise in separation
and divorce that occurred during the same period. On the other hand, a
well-established empirical correlation in the literature on marriage break-up
states that a higher age at marriage decreases the likelihood of divorce.
Marriage surprises (Weiss and Willis, 1997), driven by financial and
3 A caveat must be provided: the ratio between separations and divorces over marriages in the
same year does not take into account the lag from marriage to its break-up, i.e. the effect of mean
duration of marriage.
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Figure 3. Legal separations and divorces (1950–2001).
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preference shocks that make marriage relationships unstable, are more likely
to happen when spouses are young. However, aggregate Italian data show
that age at marriage and marital risk both registered a steady increase. This
apparent contradiction might be explained if we assume that divorce follows
an exogenous temporal path and age at marriage tries to catch up with it. In
other words, people may try to compensate for the higher levels of riskiness
by being increasingly selective in their search process. Alternatively, people
could compensate the increased level of marital risk by being more prone to
separation and divorce, therefore investing less in marital capital and then
reinforcing self-fulfilling prophecies of divorce.
Matching choices are mainly influenced by educational choices, since
schooling and university attendance can be combined with marital life, preg-
nancies and child rearing only at a substantial cost. This is not to say that
highly educated women are less likely to marry, just the opposite could be
true. Investment in education is strategic not only in the labor market: as
marriage becomes increasingly based on cooperation rather than traditional
gender roles, more education can result in better matches. A striking trend of
the increasing education of women is depicted in figure 4, where the ratio of
female to male university graduated is considered since it encompasses all
completed levels of schooling. It was only 45.9 per cent in 1950, while it
almost completely reversed to 130.2 per cent in 2001; the increasing trend was
temporarily halted during the years 1970–87, the same years in which the age
at marriage appears almost stationary.
To sum up, in the period under study, nuptiality decreased steadily, while
age at marriage rose, mainly due to higher levels of education; indicators of
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Figure 4. Ratio of graduated women to graduated men (1950–2001).
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marital disruption reveal increasing risk in marriage, while women seem
increasingly involved in higher education, compared with men. In the
empirical section of the paper, some of these trends are included in the
regression model to evaluate the differential effect of the divorce law, holding
other variables constant.
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The theoretical model used to explain the decision to marry is built around
the assumption that the search process for a partner is costly and time-
consuming. We explicitly endorse a search–theoretic structure resembling the
one provided in Filoso (2005), albeit slightly simplified.
In this stylized framework, all agents live infinite lives and in each period
receive a marriage proposal from an agent of the opposite sex. The pay-off
from marriage depends on the quality of the match and on the legal context
concerning the divorce law. The quality of the marriage proposal is the
random variable m, with m∈ [0, •), cumulated probability function F(m) and
density function f(m). Once a random meeting has occurred, both partners
observe the quality of the match and privately decide whether to accept the
current offer; if both partners agree, then marriage takes place. The utility
function is u(mt) = mt for all agents. Unmarried agents at time t have mt = 0;
also, assuming that u(0) > -•, we allow for the possibility that some agents
may remain unmarried since they never get an acceptable offer. The optimi-
zation program is
maxE u mt t
t
δ ( )⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟
=
∞
∑
0
where d is the intertemporal discount factor.
The legal scenario impacts the temporal structure of pay-offs from mar-
riage. If law forbids divorce, then agents realize that their choice is not
reversible and all the forgone future offers are lost forever once a given
partner is accepted; otherwise, if the law permits divorce—in particular,
unilateral divorce—then agents can leave a mate for a better one, but at the
same time they run the risk of being dropped by their current partner. In
other words, divorce involves a change in both prospective costs and benefits
from a legal marriage contract.
When divorce is not allowed by law, the choice problem for a prospective
bride or groom is summarized in the following Bellman equation, in which
the control variable is the binary choice taken over acceptance or rejection:
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V m
m
c V m F m
A R
( ) =
−
+ ′( ) ′( ){ }∫max ,, 1 δ δ d (1)
the left argument in the max function is the discounted value of marrying
with the current proposer and receiving m from the next period onward,
while the right argument accounts for c, which is the net benefit from remain-
ing single for a period plus ∫V(m′)dF(m′), a term that represents the expected
value of continuing search for a better partner. This equation has the reser-
vation value property (Lippman and McCall, 1976): a unique threshold level
m* is identifiable from equation (1) and is used by agents to reject all pro-
posals whose value is lower than m* and accept the first proposal whose value
is equal or greater than m*. In general, a closed form for m* can be extracted
only in very special cases for F (Heckman and MaCurdy, 1986); however, a
quasi-closed form for m can be shown (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2000) to be
equal to
m c m m F m
m
* * d
*
− =
−
′ −( ) ′( )∞∫δδ1 (2)
For a given partnership to take place it is necessary that two equations of
the (2) type—one for the prospective groom, another for the prospective
bride—hold simultaneously. More sophisticated conditions, also including
the individual share of matching surplus, can be found in the literature
(Mortensen, 1988); however, we do not deal with this complications since we
are interested in the basic features of individual search for partner.
When unilateral divorce is allowed, from the beginning of the search
process agents must take into account that, once married, the partner can
walk away: in this case, the pay-off from the current marriage proposal is
stochastic and depends on the probability g that the other partner leaves
the current marriage (Stokey et al., 1989, p. 305). Hence, the optimization
problem must be split into two stages: in the first, an agent decides whether
to get married; in the second, the same agent decides whether to stay married
or divorce and look for the next available partner. Starting from the second
stage and solving backwards gets the solution to the whole problem
(Mortensen, 1986, p. 871). It is a well-known result in stationary search
theory (Burdett and Mortensen, 1978) that agents never choose to exercise
the option to drop a match once married, so we must assume a further
structure to allow for divorce. We make the assumption that agents keep
sampling from the same distribution F while married, although at a lower
pace f, and divorce only if the utility they get from remaining married falls
behind the utility deriving from searching for a new partner. The Bellman
equation for a married agent is
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V m m V m V m c d V m
R D
M M U M( ) = + −( ) ( ) + ′( )[ ] − + ′( ){ }max ,
,
δ γ γ φδ1 (3)
where VM(m) is the value function for the choice problem of a married agent
and possible actions are remaining married or divorcing. The left argument
within the max function represents the pay-off from remaining married for a
period: the agent enjoys m, but faces a probability g of being dropped during
the next period. Accounting for this uncertainty requires writing the expected
value of the next period’s pay-off: if the other mate decides to remain
married, the expected pay-off from marriage will be (1 - g)VM(m), while if
the other mate decides to divorce, the expected pay-off from that scenario is
gVU(m′), where VU(m′) is the value function for the choice problem of an
unmarried agent, to be described later. On the right side of the max function
we find the value from divorce: in this case, the agent must bear the oppor-
tunity cost of divorce d net of any pay-off from singlehood c; after a period,
the agent goes back to the marriage market and starts his/her search again.
Turning to the first stage of the search process, we find that the choice
problem for an unmarried agent who looks for a partner is
V m V m c V m F m
A R
U M U d( ) = ( ) + ′( ) ′( ){ }∫max ,, δ (4)
As in equation (1), the left-hand argument in the Bellman equation is the
value from marriage, as described in (3), while the right-hand argument
represents the expected value from continued search. Plugging equation (3)
into (4) provides a full description of the dynamic choice problem arising
from a legal framework in which unilateral divorce is permitted.4
Previous discussion was aimed at obtaining reservation levels for marriage
quality, but these values can rarely be observed by the social scientist, so the
solution must be reformulated in order to obtain a structure that resembles
actual behavior. Usually, quality of marriage cannot be observed but age at
marriage can. The probability of leaving singlehood conditional upon past
unsuccessful search—the hazard rate—is (Devine and Kiefer, 1991)
θ λ λ= ( ) = − ( )[ ]∞∫ f m m F mm d *1* (5)
where l is the rate at which marriage offers arrive in the time unit. Finally, the
singlehood duration density is given by
h t t
m
= − ( ){ }∞∫θ θexp * d (6)
4 The model presented here is a stylized version of the search-on-the-job model described in
Rogerson et al. (2005, pp. 964–5).
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3.1 Individual-level predictors
To allow for an empirically implementable framework, we must introduce
enough structure in the search problem. In particular, two issues in modeling
age at marriage need to be addressed: time dependence and individual het-
erogeneity, both of these inducing non-stationarity in the reservation quality
of marriage.
Time dependence of age at marriage may arise from three main sources: (1)
finite horizon optimization, (2) changing marriage market conditions, and
(3) biological constraints. First, the actual time horizon for human agents is
not infinite: if special motives are not at hand to model the search process
using an infinite horizon, the finite horizon should be used instead. Second,
marriage market externalities (Burdett and Coles, 1997, 1999; Cornelius,
2003) and age preference create time dependence too: as time passes, an
increasing fraction of the pool of marriageable mates gets married, so an
agent finds marital matching increasingly difficult. The probability of a
match decreases over time as the marriage market shrinks because of the
shrinking time horizon over which marriage produces its benefits. Time
dependence may also arise because of differential fecundity: biologically,
women are more constrained than men as their fertile section of lifetime is
shorter than men’s. Given that all of these considerations impact on the
reservation quality of marriage, introducing time dependence equation (5)
can be rewritten as
θ λt F m( ) = − ( )( )[ ]1 * t
Also, different individual characteristics actually impact age at marriage:
some of them are time-invariant, such as sex and family background, while
others are time-varying, such as the level of education and job status.
Furthermore, some variables do not strictly depend on individual choice:
marriage market conditions, demographic transitions and geographical
accessibility are taken as environmental variables affecting the probability of
marriage. We group these individual-level and environmental characteristics
in the vector Xi,t so that the duration of singlehood can account for this
source of individually observed heterogeneity (Lancaster, 1990):
h t ti t i tX X, ,, exp( ) = ( ) ′{ }ψ β (7)
With this formulation, which is common in the literature on duration data,
the hazard rate is modeled as the product of the baseline hazard y(t) shared
by all agents times an exponential term depending on the set of observable
covariates and on the vector b of estimated parameters. Strictly speaking,
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previous discussion applies to the model as expressed in equation (1), but
given that a formal analytical derivation of the model allowing for unilateral
divorce is extremely difficult to analyze (van den Berg, 1990, p. 261), we leave
modeling of divorce to the empirical specification to be estimated.
4. DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES
The vector Xi,t includes variables affecting the decision to marry. These may
be partitioned into two main categories: (a) those that are—at least
partially—decided by the agent, such as educational attainment, job par-
ticipation, religious attendance, and (b) those that are not chosen, such as
family background. Whereas variables in category (b) are chosen in
advance by other agents and then typically time-invariant, variables in (a)
are usually time-varying. A residual variable that varies across time but
does not depend on individual choices is the introduction of divorce law. In
what follows it is assumed that women and men show systematically dif-
ferent search behavior, because fertility periods differ for sexes (Siow, 1998)
and women are more biologically constrained than men (Landsburg, 2000);
also, the graphical assessment of hazard ratios in figures 5 and 6 display
marked differences between sexes, with women marrying at an earlier age
than men. Given these considerations, regressions were estimated sepa-
rately for women and men, in order to clearly evaluate the interaction of
different covariates with gender. Tables 1 and 2 contain descriptive statis-
tics and Before–After comparison, respectively, for the sample used.
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Figure 5. Smoothed hazard rates by sex.
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4.1 Divorce law
Potentially, a change in divorce legislation can impact on the age at marriage
or, equivalently, the probability of transition from singlehood to marriage,
both by directly changing the option value of waiting for a better marriage
opportunity and by indirectly changing the choice variables that influence
age at marriage, such as education or job status. When examining the role
played by legal innovation in directly modifying the age at marriage, the
interest is in the following difference:
Δ = −( ) = ( ) −E h h E h E hi t i t i t i t, , , ,AD BD AD BDAfter Divorce Before Divorce( ) (8)
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Figure 6. Kaplan–Meier failure functions.
Table 1. Summary statistics
Variable
Mean
(Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Enrolled in school/university 0.2 (0.4) 0 1 83,846
Differential education 0 (0.45) -1.52 2.55 83,846
Occupational status 1.71 (1.46) 0 3 83,846
Family background factor 0 (1.39) -6.24 6.74 83,846
Religious attendance 3.45 (2.03) 1 7 78,259
Child born before marriage 0.01 (0.12) 0 1 83,846
Resident in the south 0.4 (0.49) 0 1 83,846
Year at observation 1971.98 (15.06) 1926 1999 83,846
After divorce law 0.53 (0.5) 0 1 83,846
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where hi t,AD is the mean age at marriage of an agent living in an environment
at time t in which divorce is permitted and hi t,BD is the mean age at marriage
of the same agent at time t where divorce is forbidden. Since the previous
difference cannot be estimated because the two values are never observed
simultaneously for the same agent, the counterfactual observation is con-
structed taking advantage of the panel structure of the data set. At first, a
dummy variable was created with its value set at zero for observations of
individuals at risk and not married until divorce reform and its value set at
one for all other observations afterwards. The dummy variable then parti-
tions individuals into three samples: (a) those who got married before the
reform, (b) those who entered the marriage market before the reform and
experienced the change during marital search, and (c) those who entered the
marriage market after the reform was passed. This partition provides an
opportunity to use the Before–After estimator (Heckman et al., 1999),
assuming that agents from sample (a) and (c) are intrinsically identical with
respect to their preferences and constraints, once we control for observable
covariates in Xi,t. Consequently, the remaining difference in the age at mar-
riage is attributable to the divorce law and to the interaction of the dummy
with other covariates. To estimate such a model, Lee (2005, pp. 30–2) pro-
poses the following linear specification:
log , , , , , ,h d di t i t i t i t i t i t( ) = ′ + ′ + +X Xβ ζ χ υ (9)
Table 2. Before–After statistics
Men Women
Before After D Before After D
Mean age at marriage 28.82 27.70 -1.12 25.45 25.12 -0.33
Median age at marriage 28.00 28.00 — 24.00 25.00 +1.00
Years of completed education 6.75 10.12 +3.37 5.68 10.33 +4.65
Occupational status 2.11 1.81 -0.30 1.33 1.39 +0.06
Religious attendance 3.47 2.88 -0.59 4.34 3.34 -1.00
Child born before marriage 0.00 0.01 +0.01 0.01 0.02 +0.01
Father’s education 4.65 6.78 +2.13 4.94 7.04 +2.10
Mother’s education 4.02 6.05 +2.03 4.22 6.16 +1.94
Family dimension at 14 5.18 4.08 -1.10 5.25 4.12 -1.13
House owned by back family 0.43 0.47 +0.04 0.42 0.48 +0.06
Unemployment rate—men 2.76 4.88 +2.12 2.75 4.88 +2.13
Unemployment rate—women 4.17 10.33 +6.16 4.21 10.32 +6.11
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where b is the coefficient vector for explaining variables, z is the coefficient
vector for the explaining variables interacting with the dummy variable of the
divorce law, c is the coefficient for the same dummy variable and u is an error
term whose structure also depends on the dummy variable. The value of c
captures any structural break occurring after the divorce law comes into
force, while a comparison between b and z reveals whether the explaining
variables changed their impact after the divorce law. Since the theory of
marital search provides no straightforward hint on error specification, the
issue is solved empirically in the estimation section. To account for any time
trend occurring in the period under study, which may confound the effect of
the divorce law, the year of observation is inserted as a control in itself and
also multiplied by the dummy.
4.2 Education
In marriage markets, as in other markets, rational agents tend to differentiate
their own offer. In order to obtain extra benefits from the matching mecha-
nism, people tend to escape the sluggishness of uniformity and signal them-
selves as extraordinary individuals. On the one hand, some signals can be
deceitful: matching theory has long demonstrated (Bergstrom and Manning,
1982; Roth, 1984) that in every matching game agents tend to exaggerate
their characteristics to climb the ladder of matching quality. On the other
hand, some assets reveal real qualities that do make a big difference, and
education is one of them. However, since education cannot be easily com-
bined with marital life and child rearing, more educated individuals are
expected to delay marriage until the process of acquiring an education is
completed. When traditional gender roles prevail, then education should
delay marriage more for women than for men. Higher levels of education
may lead to a more productive search that would have an ambiguous effect
on the duration of the search since direct search costs would be lowered, but
the number of searches possible per unit time would be increased (Keeley,
1977). Nonetheless, more educated individuals may be come more picky and
selective: even in this case, the net impact of education is controversial and
needs to be estimated.
As mentioned above, one problem we faced when assessing the impact of
education on marriage is that education shows an increasing trend across time,
and so it is a source of high and spurious correlation with the dummy for
divorce law. To deal with this difficulty, the following strategy was used: first
the average level of education is estimated, with this average taken across sex,
age and geographical location (North or South). Then this value is used to
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calculate the per cent difference between the actual individual level of com-
pleted education in years and the appropriate average in the following way:
Differential Education =
( ) − ( )
( )
e h e h
e h
i t t
t
, , , , ,
, ,
η σ η σ
η σ
where h stands for age, h stands for geographical location and s stands for
sex. The term differential education emphasizes only a measure of difference
and not the whole stock of human capital itself. We used this variable instead
of completed education in the regressions in order to dispel the pure effect of
education net of any temporal exogenous increase in the same variable.
Do rational agents adjust their educational choices when divorce becomes
an option? When married couples split, a higher level of education may help
both partners find a better job and recover quicker from the financial losses
from divorce. This hypothesis should prove correct especially for women,
since they can compensate a weaker job status with stronger education to a
greater extent than men. Whether differential education also impacts on age
at marriage after the reform is an interesting point. Divorce law could make
marriage markets more competitive since rents for bilateral monopoly are
lowered by the exit option. The increased level of competition may drive
agents to invest more in education to catch up with the best competitors.
However, this results in an increase in the average level of education, and
agents with education above average become fewer. Across time, the distri-
bution of education becomes more concentrated around the mean. Then, if
preferences remain constant, the premium for differential education should
become greater.
4.3 Occupational status
The choice whether to work at the market wage plays an important role in the
decision to marry (Bergstrom and Schoeni, 1996; Weiss, 1997; Burgess et al.,
2003), since the formation of a stable couple usually implies start-up costs for
a new apartment and all the utilities and furniture needed to make it function.
Whenever gender roles prevail, only one side of the couple is expected to bear
these costs for the most part. Furthermore, in the same traditional frame-
work, if men are expected to work in the market and women are expected to
work in the house, a stable job for men may impact positively on the likeli-
hood of marriage, whereas women’s likelihood of marriage should be un-
affected by their own job status, or it can be worsened. Obviously, as women
become more involved in higher education and consequently develop a
higher propensity to work outside the household, the marriage market
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adjusts to the new situation. An increasingly egalitarian pattern of marriage
due to a change in custom may lead to a substantial change in the role played
by occupational status for women. To account for labor supply choices, the
variable job status was coded in the following way: 0 for unemployed, 1 for
occasional job, 2 for seasonal job and 3 for stable job.
Interaction of divorce with job status also raises issues that parallel those
raised by education. Although, since job status is directly related to income
production, after divorce reform, its role in determining age at marriage
could also be strengthened. A better job position creates incentives to match-
ing for men since a stable job becomes more valuable when marriage dura-
tion becomes uncertain. Given that a stable job also functions as an insurance
for the hard times that can follow from divorce (Lundberg and Pollak, 2003),
women’s age at marriage should decrease as women participate more in the
job market and obtain stable status.
4.4 Religious attendance
Along with its economic, financial and social facets, marriage also has strong
religious importance. Almost any religion entails some form of celebration
for marriage, which attaches additional commitment to marital promises.
For religious people, this results in higher levels of marriage-specific invest-
ments and additional difficulties related to divorce. The current literature on
marriage behavior of Catholics in the USA (Chiswick and Lehrer, 1990;
Lehrer and Chiswick, 1993) suggests that these people tend to marry later,
with a larger fraction than average remaining permanently single. Most
probably, this depends on the perceived level of irreversibility of marriage,
enforced by religious stigma. Since the mere declaration of Catholic identity
could be misleading in a country such as Italy where Catholicism is widely
predominant, the variable used to control for religious activity is yearly
participation in religious ceremonies. This variable has seven time-invariant
modalities, ranging from 0 (no participation in a year) to 7 (more than once
a week). The variable also interacts the dummy for the introduction of
divorce to test how Catholics reacted to this crucial innovation in national
legislation. It must be borne in mind that Catholic Church does not forbid
divorce per se, but only remarriage for divorcees: those who remarry against
the religious norm are not allowed to access the sacraments.
4.5 Family background
To control for family background is important because young people rarely
leave the family home before getting married and usually retain strong links
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with their family roots (Michael and Tuma, 1985; Brien and Lillard, 1994)
and young Italians behave accordingly. Five control variables were consid-
ered: (1) years of completed father’s education, (2) years of mother’s com-
pleted education, (3) a dummy variable registering whether each individual’s
parents owned their own house, (4) the number of people present in the
parents’ house when the individual was 14, and (5) a dummy variable regis-
tering whether the subject is an only child. In principle, parents with a strong
economic situation can induce their offspring not to marry early, trading
their resources against longer single spells. We should expect parents’ edu-
cational attainments to adversely affect the likelihood of marriage since
education generally entails higher incomes and more liberal attitudes towards
marriage. Regarding family size, it is likely that in large families parents
usually cannot trade wealth against a longer stay in the house for their
offspring, so its expected impact on the likelihood of marriage should be
positive. The problem with including the previous four variables in equation
(9) is the high level of collinearity they show. To prevent instability in the
estimates, a standard principal-component analysis was used to compact the
overall variability and results are displayed in table 3. The resulting first
factor, which summarizes the effect of family background, was included in
the model to be estimated.
5. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
5.1 Sample and estimation procedure
The data used are taken from the Longitudinal Survey of Italian Families
(ILFI), which is a retrospective survey recording information on current and
past events of individual and family life.5 The first survey was held in 1997
5 The data collection and maintenance procedure is led by the Bicocca University in Milan.
Table 3. Principal-component analysis of family background
Component
First Second Third Fourth Fifth
Father’s education 0.609 0.346 -0.067 0.102 -0.704
Mother’s education 0.615 0.328 -0.061 0.074 0.710
House owned by back family -0.049 0.271 0.961 0.002 -0.000
Family dimension at 14 -0.407 0.514 -0.168 0.736 0.024
Only child 0.288 -0.660 0.200 0.665 0.003
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and subsequent ones were held every two year. The data set contains a
complete account of episodes of lives of individuals, ranging from education
to marriage, and from geographical mobility to labor experience; with this
episode structure, it is possible to obtain an exact snapshot of the situation
of an individual in a given moment and study it using event-history
methodology.
To take into account systematic differences between sexes and in order to
emphasize them clearly, each regression was run separately for women and
men. Three types of observations were excluded from the sample: (1) all
subjects who married prior to 1950, since marital behavior during war time
can be erratic due to exceptional circumstances impacting matching possi-
bilities, education and work, (2) observations prior to the age of 18, because
marriage for individuals who are under age is subject to particular legal
restrictions, and (3) observations for people who do not marry before the
49th year of their life: this exclusion is due to the biological constraint on
fertility, since late marriages presumably follow from alternative lifestyles
that do not include children rearing. As a result of this selection, in all, the
complete sample models contains 29,888 observations covering 2664 men
plus 26,046 observations covering 3150 women. The mean number of obser-
vations per man is 11.2, while per woman is 8.3. The first two waves of the
sample were included: this results in a pool of people being married not
before 1950 and not later than 1999. Since in 1999 some agents are not yet
married, an appropriate procedure was use to account for censoring.
Estimation of determinants of age at marriage requires setting up a statis-
tical model specifying a functional form for equation (9). Since many possible
distributional specifications are available and the economic theory of mar-
riage does not provide any clear-cut hint about them, we chose to adopt the
function that best fits the sample. At first the unconditional hazard rate was
plotted for men and women and reported in figure 5 (the corresponding
survivor functions are plotted in figure 6). These figures show strong concav-
ity in hazard rates: even though this is not unambiguous evidence of time-
dependency of the hazard rate, it is likely that the largest fraction of
marriages does happen during a well-defined time interval that roughly cor-
responds to the fertile section of adult life, and this holds true especially for
women. A natural implication is that the hazard rate cannot be assumed to be
constant over time, so that the exponential specification must be put aside.
Next, we estimated the gender-based models over several competing distri-
butional assumptions. Results are reported in table 4. Relying on the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)
(Koehler and Murphree, 1988; Ludden et al., 1994), we find that the Gamma
distribution fits the data best. The corresponding c2 values provide support
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for the Weibull distribution for women, but the difference with Gamma
distribution is very limited. Thus, the choice for the parametrization to adopt
is the Gamma function: estimation results for this specification are displayed
in the second and third and sixth and seventh columns of table 5.
One problem with parametric estimation is that a substantial interpreta-
tion can rarely be given to the parameters that are intrinsic to the distribution
function. Thus, an alternative way to frame the problem is to consider the
baseline hazard as a nuisance and estimate it through a semi-parametric
approach that does not rely on any distributional assumption. In our context,
this procedure was performed using the Cox estimator and results are dis-
played in the fourth and fifth and eighth and ninth columns of table 5.
Both for parametric and for semi-parametric specifications, the standard
errors were estimated using a bootstrap technique with 100 replications.
Furthermore, since we are dealing with individual data, the bias from un-
observed heterogeneity is an issue than can distort estimates. Given that the
Gamma model is highly parameterized, modeling individual heterogeneity
via an additional distribution function is computationally very expensive and
leads to parameter estimates that have little economic interpretation. Con-
sequently, we decided to deal with heterogeneity by stratifying estimates over
individuals: the resulting estimates are constrained to have equal coefficients
across strata, but intercepts and ancillary parameters are allowed to vary
Table 4. Comparison between alternative distributional assumptions
Model
LL
(null)
LL
(model) d.f. AIC BIC c 2
Men
Weibull -27.02 436.70 13 -847.40 -733.60 603.05
Gamma 940.94 1271.11 13 -2516.21 -2402.41 587.37
Log-Normal 740.84 1098.06 12 -2172.11 -2067.07 601.75
Log-Logistic 847.58 1232.27 12 -2440.55 -2335.50 628.03
Exponential -4022.50 -1723.33 11 3468.65 3564.94 3675.97
Gompertz -650.58 -21.98 12 67.97 173.01 853.62
Women
Weibull -645.28 185.66 12 -347.31 -245.11 865.90
Gamma 652.52 1146.19 13 -2266.37 -2155.65 877.72
Log-Normal 280.67 920.65 12 -1817.30 -1715.10 1048.62
Log-Logistic 407.29 1054.85 12 -2085.71 -1983.50 1094.12
Exponential -4326.91 -2798.70 11 5619.39 5713.08 2402.22
Gompertz -1461.64 -530.44 12 1084.89 1187.09 882.66
LL, log-likelihood.
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according to each stratum. The whole procedure has a strikingly resemblance
with the fixed-effect estimator for panel data.
As regards the interpretation of the parameter sign, the two models are
estimated using different metrics. The Gamma model uses the Accelerated
Failure-Time metric, while the Cox model uses the Log Relative-Hazard
metric. For example, a positive estimated coefficient in the Accelerated
Failure-Time metric indicates longer durations for higher values of the cova-
riate, while in the Log Relative-Hazard metric a positive coefficients indicates
higher probability of a transition of state for higher values of the covariate,
which results in shorter durations. Basically, when contrasting the two
models, the statistically significant coefficients display opposite signs across
the two models. With regard to interpretation of estimated parameters in the
Cox model, it is worth recalling that the baseline hazard y(t) in equation (7)
is not parametrically estimated: hence, the only possible interpretations
about the hazard rate can be made for changes in independent variables
(Singer and Willett, 2003). A percentage variation in the hazard rate in
response to a variation in the exogenous variable Xj from x0 to x1 can be
calculated as follows:
e e
e
j j j j
j j
X x X x
X x
β β
β
=( ) =( )
=( )
−⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥⋅
1 0
0
100 (10)
which in the case of a dummy variable reduces to e jβ −[ ]⋅1 100.
5.2 Comments
5.2.1 Divorce law
The estimated impact of the dummy variable on the marriage hazard rate is
largely positive, both for women and for men, in the Cox and in the Gamma
specifications. This implies that individuals responded to the introduction of
divorce law by shortening their search spells. Compared with the no-divorce
scenario and other things being equal, marriage has become a riskier business
both for men and for women. However, in our sample people seem to
respond to this change in the rules of the game by increasing their propensity
to marry, which is puzzling since an increase in risk should produce a
decrease in the demand for marriage. To solve this riddle, it is worth going
back to the basic mechanics of marriage. As was noted in the theoretical
section, marriage is a multiperiod contract, and a legal innovation introduc-
ing the possibility of breaking the contract impacts on both married couples
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and individual agents who are considering whether to marry. Following this
legal change, married agents register a decrease in their reservation utility: the
marriages that dissolve are those in which at least one partner prefers divorce
to staying with the current partner. This explains why during the years
immediately following the introduction of divorce the number of divorces
rocketed, as it is clear from figure 3. This was a temporary effect due to the
adjustment of the previous stock of marginal couples. Most likely, this legal
innovation also changed the equilibrium within inframarginal couples, i.e.
those who adjust to the new legislation but decide not to break; however,
we do not investigate the issue in this paper, since our focus is on single
individuals who are considering whether to marry.
The impact of regime change on prospective marriages is twofold: on the
one hand, since marriage implies idiosyncratic investments, the possibility of
unilateral divorce makes the contract riskier. Consequently, risk-adverse
partners should become more cautious when considering the option of mar-
riage. Some of these people may decide not to marry at all, while others may
become more selective. As a result, the average length of search spell registers
an increase.6 However, should the marriage prove unsatisfactory, each
partner is given by the law the possibility to break it—bearing a fraction of its
cost—and possibly starting another marriage anew. In the search process,
this innovation pushes individuals to become less picky since divorce is a way
out from a bad marriage: the outcome would be a decrease in the average
length of search spell. Economic theory of marriage has no clear prediction
on the net effect of these two contrasting forces. Our estimation results
suggest that, on balance, what prevails between these two opposing forces is the
increased utility deriving from the availability of the new exit option.
An alternative way to model this balance of forces, although it is not very
common in marriage economics literature, consists in framing the decision to
marry in the context of modern investment theory.7 While traditional theory
investigates the binary choice between investing and not investing, the most
6 Although the ILFI survey does not collect information on knowledge and use of birth control
methods, it must be noted that over the period under study, the increasing diffusion of more
sophisticated birth control techniques may have helped men and women to postpone marriage,
since contraception makes premarital sex relatively less costly and risky (Goldin and Katz,
2000). This is an element contributing to sharpen one’s own policy of marital investment in a
specific partner and improving the search technology. I thank an anonymous referee for calling
my attention to this point.
7 In fact, the best book to date on the subject (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) calls for an extensive use
of option value concept in the economic theory of the family. This suggestion does not seem to
be taken into account by family economists, apart from the remarkable exception of Strobel
(2003).
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recent theory based on option value stresses the role played by irreversible
actions and fixed costs. Since the first marriage entails a permanent change in
personal status, people can choose rationally when to exercise the option of
marrying. A basic result of option value theory says that the more irreversible
an investment, the longer will be the period spent waiting to use the related
option. In our model, a marriage that does not include the possibility of
divorce is more irreversible than a marriage in which individuals can divorce
unilaterally when individual utility falls below a given threshold. Hence, the
change in divorce legislation promotes shorter search spells. Our evidence
suggests that Italian couples respond to incentives related to irreversibility
and decreased waiting time. In terms of the traditional theory of marriage,
our data show individuals put a heavier weight on the possibility of escaping
a bad marriage rather than on the security of a lifelong marriage.
From estimation results it is evident that women reacted more than men to
the change in legislation. A possible explanation for this result is that women
on average are more constrained than men in their search for matching
partners, given that their biological clock related to fertility ticks faster than
men’s. A lower level of irreversibility, from a woman’s standpoint, could be
valued more positively than from a man’s perspective since it lowers the
penalty related to a bad match. Consequently, women should discount less
than men the possibility of marriage break-up and their search strategy is
more affected by the exit option than men’s.
To control for the confounding effect of the time trend on the dummy
variable for divorce, year at observation was inserted to account for aggre-
gate trend which reflects unobservable changes. The estimated values show
decreasing age at marriage before 1971, with a strong structural break occur-
ring at 1971, and then an almost flat tendency.
5.2.2 Educational attainment and job status
Being enrolled in the educational system increases the length of search
spell. Using the Cox estimates to derive quantitative predictions, a man
who is studying faces a hazard rate that is -53.2 per cent lower than the
hazard rate faced by a man who is not studying. For women, the decrease
in the hazard ratio following enrollment in the educational system is 64.2
per cent. In general, better education brings improvements both in house-
hold and in market productivity, along with immaterial benefits that
impact positively on child rearing, but these benefits come at the cost of
delaying the marriage and reducing the expected number of children. Esti-
mation shows that the delaying effect is stronger for women. What is the
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rationale for this finding? Since education is also an intermediate good in
the production of family income, a lower level of education can be traded
against a better job position, for education and job are partially substitut-
able in the production of family income and welfare. Probably, men can
trade education against labor and remain in a strong competitive position
in the marriage market, while women have a weaker degree of substitut-
ability. This is partly due to higher levels of the unemployment rate for
women and to the higher reservation wages that women demand to enter
the labor market: for them, demand for education must be higher if they
want to form good matches in the marriage market. The estimation reveals
the presence of a trade-off between accumulating additional human capital
and waiting for a better partner on the one hand, and accumulating less
human capital and marrying earlier on the other. This trade-off proves
more binding for women than for men since men are less constrained by
labor and marriage markets conditions. After the introduction of divorce,
the impact of education remains stable for men, while it changes for
women: now, this value becomes -100.0 per cent, which implies that study-
ing becomes more difficult to reconcile with marriage and that, once in the
educational system, women become less prone to marry since this could
lead to study interruption or canceling. This reflects that, after divorce,
education becomes more valuable for women than for men.
Differential education also plays a role in determining age at marriage, but
this is reflected in an increase in age at marriage. A man endowed with
education that is 10 per cent higher than the reference pool of marriageable
men faces a -80.9 per cent decrease in his hazard rate, while women face
-75.5 per cent decrease. This surprisingly small gender difference is probably
attributable to the effect that extra education plays in the marriage market
for women. Most probably, these agents face larger difficulties compared
with agents with negative differential education, since the former tend to
match with similar types that are quite rare in the marriage market, so their
search becomes longer. After the divorce reform took place, the negative
effect of differential education became stronger both for men and for women:
the same increase of 10 per cent in differential education for women results in
a chance in the hazard rate of -99.2 per cent. Since differential education is
mainly a positional good, this variation across time may reflect the higher
level of average education among women and a decreased dispersion around
the mean.
Job status displays strong asymmetric effects on sexes. The effect of chang-
ing job status from unemployment to a stable job increases men’s age at
marriage by 48.4 per cent, while for women the change is -46.0 per cent: the
two values are virtually the opposite of one another. An enhancement in job
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status has a positive impact on the probability of marriage for men and tends
to decrease their search spell; on the contrary, a positive variation in the same
variable makes marriage less likely for women and delays it. Men with better
positions in the job market can afford marriage more easily, since they are
able to support a family on a stable basis, and prospective partners of the
opposite sex attach value to this asset. These results provide evidence that
unemployment or job instability make men less likely to marry. On the
contrary, women who are stronger in the job market probably face greater
difficulties in marrying since home production and child rearing can be
matched with working outside the house only at a substantial cost. Thus, we
have a substitution effect on marriage probability: a more stable job implies
lower gains from trade and a decreased propensity to marry for women.
Furthermore, when traditional gender roles prevail, the same men have
higher gains from trade in marriage, so they are likely to marry for they lose
much from being single. This finding corroborates Becker’s result that high
income should create incentives for men not to marry late (Becker, 1991
[1981]). From estimation results, the change in legislation impacted the role
played by job position in determining the hazard rate. The transition from
unemployment to a stable job now results in a 117.2 per cent increase for
men, while it results in a -39.7 per cent decrease for women. This shows an
11.8 per cent decrease in the penalty attached to stable job. As expected, this
last result confirms that after divorce reform, the marriage market for women
adjusted to the new strategic role of job status.
5.2.3 Religious attendance
From estimation results religious attendance does not play any significant
role in explaining male probability of marriage, while it exerts a small nega-
tive effect on women’s probability of marital transition. Considering a
change in participation in church celebrations from none to more than once
a week, the corresponding decrease in the hazard rate is -11.8 per cent. This
result is consistent with previous literature showing that high levels of service
attendance and religious involvement for Catholics tend to delay marriage
because of the high perceived irreversibility. More interestingly, the impact of
religious attendance when divorce is allowed by national law (but not by
Catholic law) is reversed: it becomes positive, with a value around 21.2 per
cent. This reversed trend may result from the new emphasis given by the
Catholic Church to traditional family after 1971, combined with increased
strong prohibitions of pre-marital sex and abortions, which drove young
Catholic women towards earlier marriages.
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5.2.4 Family background and other controls
According to the estimation results, the role played by family background on
the search spell is of mild importance. For men it is significant only after 1971,
while for women the value remains the same across the whole sample and the
magnitudes of the effects are basically constant across genders. Since parents’
education is positively related to the factor, and given that the estimated
parameter in the Cox model is negative, an increase in parental education
decreases the likelihood of marriage. In general, more educated parents place
a high value on the education of their children and tend to create wealthier
families and emotionally comfortable environments, thereby increasing the
reservation value of leaving the parental nest. In addition, the larger the
family, the more traditional the gender expectations will be for the offspring:
young women are required to help their parents and siblings, while men are
required to find a job and leave the parents’ house. Furthermore, all other
variables held constant, larger families usually display lower levels of average
consumption, a factor that is likely to work against long spells of singlehood.
Another control was geographical location, since systematic differences in
the economic and social performance of southern and northern Italian regions
are commonly observed (Barbagli and Saraceno, 1997; Schizzerotto, 2002;
Barbagli et al., 2003). The dummy control variable for geographical location
interacting with the divorce law provides weak evidence that residence in the
South tends to decrease women’s search spell by a value close to 4.2 per cent,
while for men the percentage change is around 24.9 per cent, although the p
values suggest significance just for a limited fraction of the sample.
The last control introduced in the regression models is a dummy variable
for a child born before marriage. The main effect is on men, both before and
after the divorce law. Before the divorce law, a child born increases the
hazard ratio by 67.4 per cent; after the divorce law, this value decreases to
10.2 per cent. From our sample, women seem to be affected by out-of-
wedlock births in a very limited way.
Year at observation was inserted to take account of aggregate trends that
reflect unobservable changes. The estimated values show decreasing age at
marriage before 1971, with a strong structural break occurring in 1971, and
then an almost flat tendency.
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper the effect of the introduction of divorce on marriage was
investigated using a retrospective Italian data survey. Since Italy is one of the
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countries that introduced such a major social innovation in a not-so-far past,
these data provide an interesting fount of natural experiment.
In the theoretical section, the underlying microeconomic model is based on
the assumption that agents sample sequentially from a given distribution of
available mates and choose optimally whether to accept a marriage offer,
given their endowment of specific personal traits. Some of these traits are
exogenously given, such as the family background or current conditions in
the marriage market, while others are a matter of choice, such as investment
in education or the level of involvement in the labor market. When divorce is
not permitted by law, the decision to marry is irreversible, while the intro-
duction of divorce introduces the possibility of serial marriages. This inno-
vation creates incentives to change search behavior since marital investment
becomes riskier, but divorce is also an exit option.
In the empirical section, we tested the effect of the new divorce legislation
on the probability of marriage. The dummy variable for the introduction of
divorce was inserted into the complete sample, whereas the same dummy
interacted with other variables that are a matter of choice. Other variables
at the personal and at the environmental levels were included to control
for confounding effects. Results show that the very introduction of divorce
reduced the average search spell, since availability of a new exit option makes
the decision to marry less irreversible than it was in the past. This inter-
pretation is consistent with the option value theory of investment.
An important lesson from these results is the asymmetric behavior of men
and women approaching the age at marriage. Most probably, women who
plan to have children tend to put a heavier weight on offspring welfare
compared with men, so they invest less in their own human capital and more
in marriage-specific capital: as a consequence, the introduction of divorce
affects their marginal choice between marrying or otherwise. This change in
evaluation does not necessarily imply that women are penalized by divorce:
in a recent article, Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) provide evidence that a shift
from consensual to no-fault divorce legislation had a positive impact on
women’s welfare in the USA, since the threat of divorce is capable of lower-
ing domestic violence, female suicide and distress.
The point of this paper is different, since it emphasizes the search behavior
that precedes marriage: even though a bad marriage is easier to interrupt for
women, when men tend to search less for a good match, the quality of
marriage obviously could decline, and both spouses may be affected. It is
documented (Stevenson, 2003) that more liberal divorce laws decrease the
level of investment in marriage-specific assets, such as spouse’s education,
children and household specialization: this can result in weaker family links
that make divorce more likely. In this perspective, the positive trend of
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divorce could be due more to men’s dissatisfaction than women’s. True, a
change the introduction of divorce changes the balance of power in a mar-
riage, giving more leverage to the weaker or more vulnerable spouse, but
rational agents tend to adjust their pre-marital behavior to these new rules
(Gruber, 2004). Any innovation comes at a cost: divorce is no exception.
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